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1 Introduction and Purpose 
1. The DfES wishes to develop an evidence-based strategy for developing the market in children’s 
services, which are identified as education, social care, health and other services for children, 
young people and families, including parents. 
2. The DfES contracted PricewaterhouseCoopers to produce four separate reports on five children’s 
services markets.  The markets are: 
• Children’s Homes and Fostering (which are two separate but very closely linked markets) 
• Parental & Family Support Services 
• Positive Activities for Young People 
• Childcare. 
3. The research specification for each market was different, and the research findings are contained 
in four separate reports.  This overarching report draws together the themes from the four 
reports. 
4. Our methodology included detailed desk research of all available national data sources, and a 
case study approach with local authorities.  This allowed us to investigate the five markets in six 
local authority areas, by interviewing local authority officers responsible for children’s services, 
interrogating their databases, researching and interviewing a range of local providers, and 
conducting qualitative research with users of services.  The local authority areas have been 
anonymised. 
5. We are very grateful to the many local authority officers who gave up their time to discuss issues 
in their local markets, without whom we could not have developed a detailed understanding of 
the issues. 
6. The objectives of this report are twofold: 
• To identify the cross-cutting issues common to the markets; 
• To put forward suggestions for improvement as inputs into DfES policy thinking. 
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2 Executive Summary 
Introduction 
7. Since the publication of the 2003 Green Paper, Every Child Matters there has been considerable 
progress in the development of children’s services markets. 
8. The funding of 35 children’s trusts in pathfinder local authority areas, an evaluation of which is 
due to be completed by the National Children’s Bureau in 2007; the establishment of 1000 
children’s centres by the end of 2006 providing integrated services to children under five and 
their families; the appointment of directors of children’s services within local authorities to drive 
integration; and improved commissioning practices in local authorities (including in more than 
one of the six local authorities we interviewed) are all good examples of progress. 
9. However, from this study of five children’s services markets evidence has emerged that in some 
cases LAs are not meeting children’s, young people’s and parents’ needs effectively, and are not 
delivering best value-for-money.  Our conclusion is that more could be done to accelerate 
change, and to enable children’s services markets to operate more effectively.   
10. We have identified a number of barriers that exist to effective market operation.  The barriers 
that exist in the fostering market are typical of these markets and include: a lack of transparency 
on costs; limited visibility of markets; a shortage of experienced commissioners; limited 
dialogue between suppliers and commissioners; inconsistent application of overall national 
frameworks; and potentially conflicting roles of local authorities acting as commissioner and 
provider. 
11. These barriers need to be addressed to improve the operation of the markets.  The DfES can play 
a significant role in removing the barriers and encouraging effective and strategic 
commissioning.  However, in intervening in the market place, the Department’s intentions 
should be clearly communicated and the impact of intervention monitored for adverse 
consequences (there is some emerging evidence of unintended adverse consequences in the 
childcare market). 
Market Characteristics 
12. The drivers of demand in the three largest markets, childcare, fostering and children’s homes are 
more established, stronger and sustained than in positive activities or parental and family support 
services.  The markets are larger and better documented, so there is greater visibility of demand 
and supply to commissioners and providers.  The markets for positive activities and parental and 
family support services are less well established, and are Government-led through funding of the 
Youth Service, children’s centres or grants to voluntary and community sector providers. 
13. The structure of supply is similar in the children’s homes and fostering markets.  The traditional 
providers are in-house, and there is a voluntary and community sector presence, but in the last 
five years the private sector has added significant capacity and now has a large market share. 
14. The structure of supply is similar in the positive activities and parental and family support 
services markets; most services are provided in-house or by the voluntary and community sector, 
with private provision only being present in certain specific sectors. 
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15. Childcare is a market that is traditionally a private sector market, with a significant voluntary and 
community sector presence, but one in which Government is now playing a greater role not only 
through supply side interventions, such as the funding of places for 3 and 4 year olds, and the 
1000 children’s centres that will be established by the end of 2006, but also through the demand 
side, through Tax Credits. 
16. Provision in all of these markets is very fragmented at a national level, with no large providers 
having a share of the market more than in single figures.  Children’s service markets are local 
markets, however, and at a local level choice and competition can be limited. 
Suggestions for Improvement 
17. We have put forward six overarching suggestions on how the DfES could further develop 
children’s services markets in line with its policy on contestable markets. 
18. The first suggestion is that the DfES should 
Articulate a vision for market provision, 
based on best practice. 
 
19. The evidence from the six case study areas suggests that many commissioners do not have a 
strong sense of what the vision for their local market could, or should, be.  In our view it would 
be helpful for DfES to provide a degree of guidance on what local authorities should expect 
diverse provision to look like in children’s services markets, based on its knowledge of best 
practice.  Our research suggests that there is no “one-size-fits-all”, and that a vision for market 
provision should be a guideline only. 
20. The second suggestion is that the DfES should 
Encourage a level playing field 
 
21. The need to create a level playing field is paramount, as the evidence suggests that markets such 
as children’s homes and fostering are distorted by the local authority dual role of commissioner 
and provider.  All six of the case study local authorities preferred to commission in-house 
services in children’s homes and fostering in preference to using the external market. 
22. Our interview programme confirmed the perception of the private sector that more work needs to 
be done to create a level playing field.  Private providers of children’s homes, or independent 
fostering agencies, made the observation noted in the paragraph above, but many accept it as a 
characteristic of the market place.  Private providers in these markets also commented upon the 
perception held by many local authorities that private provision is more expensive than in-house 
provision.  The evidence is that this was “perception” and was not substantiated by analysis of 
like-for-like data.  
23. Encouraging greater separation between the local authority commissioning function and in-house 
provision is essential, and will help overcome the mistrust that frequently exists between local 
authority commissioners and private providers.  The DfES could encourage this separation by 
providing alternative organisational models for local authorities to follow, with practical testing 
through local authority pilots. 
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24. We have made several suggestions to assist local authorities to develop more professional 
procurement practices, but also to remove constraints on in-house providers to enable them to 
compete effectively on a more level playing field. 
25. The third suggestion is that the DfES should 
Encourage the development of regional 
markets 
 
26. Local markets can be relatively small, choice can be limited, and sometimes there is no effective 
competition at a local level.  In a single local authority area, for example, the demand in the 
children’s homes market is frequently as low as for 40 beds.  Although a joint commissioning 
framework exists, our research suggested that a limited amount of joint commissioning is 
happening.  DfES could work through the DfES Centre for Procurement Performance with 
regional centres of excellence to encourage the development of regional commissioning.  We 
have suggested funding of pilot schemes to demonstrate the benefits to local authorities. 
27. The fourth suggestion is that the DfES should 
Assist local authorities to manage local 
markets 
 
28. There is a great deal of evidence from the six case study areas that local authorities find it 
difficult to manage their local children’s services markets effectively, although there are 
exceptions where successful market management is providing some useful lessons (one authority 
in particular). 
29. There are several reasons why local authorities find it difficult to manage markets; the markets 
are opaque and difficult to size with any degree of precision; demand is insufficiently visible to 
providers, and commissioners have limited market intelligence on suppliers; commissioners do 
not have good quality pricing and costing data, so cannot make proper comparisons and choices;  
commissioners rarely have the time or the experience to engage in a proper dialogue with 
independent providers and manage their markets; and the necessary skills and capabilities to 
commission successfully are in short supply. 
30. Our interview programme with voluntary and community sector providers raised the issue of 
how their provision is commissioned and funded.  Interviewees commented upon how service 
level agreements were being drawn up as part of competitively tendered contracts, often by 
inexperienced commissioners, with inappropriate performance measures in them.  Designing 
appropriate performance measures for voluntary and community sector providers needs to be a 
feature of improved commissioning and procurement practices for it to become a viable 
alternative to grant funding and partnership working. 
31. We have made several suggestions for actions the DfES could implement to assist local 
authorities in managing their markets.  These suggestions include providing templates, 
disseminating best practice, encouraging and sponsoring forums, and so on. 
32. The fifth suggestion is that the DfES should 
Encourage reduced complexity and 
increased transparency of funding 
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33. Funding characteristics follow similar patterns across positive activities and parental and family 
support services; the majority of funding is not through the core local authority budget, but from 
targeted, time-limited central Government grants (some of these are provided by the DfES such 
as the Extended Schools Standard Fund or the Children’s Fund, but others are provided by the 
Home Office or the DCLG, for example The Neighbourhood Renewal Fund or the New Deal for 
Communities Fund). 
34. The fragmentation of this funding and its time-limited nature makes strategic planning difficult, 
and raises questions over whether the service can be sustained in the long-term.  This provides 
difficulties for both commissioners and providers in how they distribute and access funding, as 
well as in long-term planning.  One case study example we encountered was a voluntary and 
community sector provider of positive activities that financed its £2m of Youth Service support 
through seventeen different grants through different parts of the same local authority. 
35. We have made several suggestions to the DfES to reduce this complexity, but we recognise this 
will require the cooperation of at least the DCLG and the Home Office. 
36. The sixth and final suggestion is that the DfES should 
Improve visibility of DfES policy and 
market strategy 
 
37. There was evidence from our interview programme with external market providers that they did 
not understand Government policy and strategy, and were confused regarding Government 
intentions in the long-term.  There is evidence emerging in the childcare market that the strategy 
to provide free places for 3 and 4 year olds, and to provide provision for under fives and their 
families in children’s centres is causing concern among private providers; government intentions 
are not fully understood. 
38. Similarly, the time-limited nature of central Government grant funding for positive activities and 
parental and family support services means that Government’s intention for these markets 
beyond the current time-horizon (often three years) is not well communicated.  While markets 
can change significantly in a three year period, and the Government cannot be seen to provide 
assurances of unlimited funding, it is nevertheless desirable to offer greater levels of assurance 
where possible to market participants. 
39. We have made the suggestion that the DfES develops a communication strategy to provide 
assurances to in-house, private and voluntary and community sector providers that it understands 
their concerns and is addressing them through its market development programme. 
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3 Policy Context 
Background to Every Child Matters: Change for Children 
40. This research was commissioned by the DfES following key changes in the way children’s 
services are planned, managed, commissioned and delivered.  The 2003 Green Paper, Every 
Child Matters, built on existing plans to strengthen the role and remit of preventative services for 
children by: 
• Increasing the focus on supporting families and carers - the most critical influence on 
children's lives; 
• Ensuring necessary intervention takes place before children reach crisis point and protecting 
children from falling through the net; 
• Addressing the underlying problems identified in the report into the death of Victoria 
Climbié – including weak accountability and poor integration; 
• Ensuring that the people working with children are valued, rewarded and trained.  
41. Following extensive debate and consultation, Every Child Matters: Change for Children was 
developed as a new approach to the well-being of children and young people, from birth to age 
nineteen. 
42. The Government's aim is for every child, whatever their background or their circumstances, to 
have the support they need to: 
• Be healthy;  
• Stay safe;  
• Enjoy and achieve;  
• Make a positive contribution;  
• Achieve economic well-being.  
43. This has resulted in the creation of children’s trusts, which bring together all education, health, 
social care and other services for young people and their families, and ensure that organisations 
involved with providing services to children are working together. 
44. Further information on Every Child Matters: Change for Children and children’s trusts can be 
found on the DfES website at www.everychildmatters.gov.uk. 
DfES policy on contestable markets 
45. Following this overall change in the commissioning and delivery of children’s services, the 
DfES, together with other Government departments, wishes to encourage and sustain contestable 
markets.  In particular there are concerns that the range and quality of supply of children’s 
services is not always sufficient to meet the level of demand, both at national and at local levels. 
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46. In addition to adding capacity by encouraging a diversity of quality supply, the DfES would also 
like to see markets improved in terms of: 
• Quality of services delivered; 
• Range of suppliers; 
• Competitive pricing structures; 
• Innovative working practices; 
• Choice of alternatives where existing provision is failing. 
47. In addition to a breadth of quality supply, other conditions are seen as necessary to encourage 
effective markets in children’s services.  This review has considered the relative importance of 
the following areas: 
• Commissioning and procurement practices, including the skills required to optimise buying 
power; 
• Understanding how commissioners can best manage their markets; 
• Understanding the barriers to creating and sustaining contestable markets. 
48. It is recognised that these aims can create certain tensions.  These have also been considered in 
the context of the markets considered, notably the aims to: 
• Improve efficiency and costs while also improving availability of high quality provision; 
• Promote quality and safeguard children while also seeking to stimulate innovation; 
• Encourage individual choice while achieving benefits from managing the market; 
• Encourage small providers who can offer innovation while benefiting, where possible, from 
larger providers able to offer economies of scale through block or bulk purchasing. 
Role of the Voluntary and Community Sector 
49. This research has also considered current thinking on the role of the voluntary and community 
sector (VCS) and Social Enterprises (which together comprise the “third sector”). In encouraging 
an effective market, consideration should also be given to the barriers that limit the role of the 
VCS. 
50. In some cases, capacity building or other infrastructure support offered to VCS providers, co-
operation to promote their particpation and consideration of the regulatory burdens placed on 
suppliers have also been considered. 
51. In undertaking this work, we have also considered the policies of other government departments, 
in particular Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) as regards local 
government policy and the efficiency agenda, Home Office and Treasury as regards the Third 
Sector, DTI as regards social enterprise organisations, OGC as regards cross government market 
management and the IdeA and Regional Centres of Procurement Excellence as regards local 
government procurement practice and the efficiency agenda. 
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4 Market Characteristics 
Description of Demand 
Demand side characteristics 
52. Our four detailed reports provide considerable amounts of information on the demand side of the 
five markets, including quantitative data where available.  Where we use the term “clients” we 
mean the users of services. 
53. In drawing up comparisons of the demand side of these markets, high quality demand side 
information is typically not available.  Some quantitative data are available on market size and 
growth, and numbers of clients, but primarily for the three markets that are better documented 
(ie, children’s homes, fostering and childcare).  The table below summarises the main 
characteristics of the five markets researched; 
Demand Side of the Markets: Key Characteristics 
 
Market Clients / Number Client Segments Market Size 
Estimates 
Market Growth 
Estimates 
Market Drivers 
Children’s 
Homes 
• 5,900 children in 
homes (2004) 
• 5,700(E) children 
in homes (2005) 
• By age (10 to 15 
yrs largest 
segment) 
• By need 
• By ethnicity 
• UASC** 
• £850m net 
expenditure by 
local authorities* 
• 7.1% CAGR on 
spend 2000/01 to 
2003/04 
• (1.1)% CAGR on 
numbers of 
children 
• Preference for 
fostering 
• Cost 
• Increasing need and 
challenging 
behaviour 
• Use of other care 
settings 
Fostering • 41,600 fostered 
children (2004) 
• By age (10 to 15 
yrs largest 
segment) 
• By need 
• By ethnicity 
• UASC** 
• £800m net 
expenditure by 
local authorities * 
• 13.4% CAGR on 
spend 2000/01 to 
2003/04 
• 2.8% CAGR on 
numbers of 
children 
• Growth driven by 
10 to 15 yr segment 
• UASC** 
• Increasing need and 
challenging 
behaviour 
Childcare • 4,600,000 
children 0 to 7*** 
• 1.522m daycare 
placements 
(2005), but NAO 
indicates unmet 
demand (2002) 
• By age (1 to 2, 3 
to 4, 5 and above) 
• £6,685m (2005) 
**** of which … 
! £3,465m private 
sector including 
£315m Tax 
Credit funding 
! £3,220m direct 
govt provision 
• Growth in Ofsted 
registered places 
from 1.415m (Q1 
04) to 1.522m 
(Q2 05) 
• Increasing numbers 
of mothers returning 
to work 
• GDP growth 
• Population of 
children aged 0 to 7 
(increasing to 2011) 
Positive 
Activities 
for Young 
People 
• Young people 13 
to 19 yrs (4.3m) 
• Low particip. 
from. … 
• 16-19yrs 
• Less affluent  
white young men 
• Pakistani / Bangl. 
young women 
• LBGT 
• Disabled  
• Young carers 
• 4.3m 13 to 19 
year olds  
• Participation rate 
of 70% of young 
people 13 to 19 
yrs in Positive 
Activities 
• Youth Service 
total spend of 
£305.7m and 
8,410 FTE 
delivery staff in 
03/04 
• Youth service 
spend grew 
10.7% between 
02/03 and 03/04 
• Demographic trends 
• Government stated 
aim in Youth 
Matters Green Paper 
that every young 
person should 
benefit from access 
to 2 hrs of sport, 2 
hrs of other 
constructive 
activities and 
opportunities to 
volunteer 
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Market Clients / Number Client Segments Market Size 
Estimates 
Market Growth 
Estimates 
Market Drivers 
Parental 
& Family 
Support 
Svcs 
• Parents of 
children aged 0-
19 
• By need … 
! Preventative 
tiers 1 and 2 
! Remedial tiers 
3 and 4 
! Hard to reach 
groups … 
! BME 
! Fathers 
• £642m LA spend 
2004/05 
• 6,000 service 
providers in 
England & Wales 
identified by 
NFPI 
• 11.7% CAGR on 
LA spend 00/01-
04/05 
• Significant unmet 
and latent demand 
exists at lower 
tiers of need 
• Market at higher 
tiers relatively flat 
• Changing public 
attitudes and rising 
awareness of 
services available at 
lower tiers of need 
 
* These market size estimates, by value, are likely to be conservative (due to local authority reporting underestimating 
the full cost of in-house provision) 
**  Unaccompanied Asylum Seeker Children 
*** GAD 2004 based projections 
**** NAO 2004:Early Years: Progress in developing high quality childcare and early education accessible to all.  Laing & 
Buisson estimate the total PVI nursery market by value is £3,360m, of which £2,600m (77%) is estimated to be private 
purchases by parents.  Our work focused on the PVI nursery sector. 
Note: CAGR is Compound Annual Growth Rate, which is the year on year percentage growth rate 
 
54. There are a number of observations that can be made: 
• The drivers of demand in the three largest markets, childcare, fostering and children’s homes 
are more established, stronger and sustained than in positive activities or parental and family 
support services.  The markets are larger and better documented, so there is greater visibility 
of demand and supply to commissioners and providers. 
• The markets for positive activities and parental and family support services are less well 
established, and are Government-led through funding of the Youth Service, children’s 
centres or grants to voluntary and community sector providers. 
• Market sizes vary substantially across these markets.  Market sizes for positive activities and 
parental and family support services cannot be reliably estimated due the fragmentation of 
the markets.  The market sizes for fostering and children’s homes are estimated as £800m 
and £850m respectively, while the childcare market is estimated by NAO as £6.7bn.  These 
three are clearly large markets with sufficiently strong demand drivers to attract significant 
private sector provision. 
• Based on available indicators, all markets appear to be growing in value terms at or close to 
double-digit rates, much of which is driven by Government funding.  A key observation on 
children’s homes and fostering is that expenditure on these markets is growing at a much 
faster rate than the number of children needing to be looked after.  In children’s homes the 
number of looked-after-children has been declining at 1.1% pa while expenditure has been 
growing at 7.1% pa; the number of children being fostered has been growing at 2.8% pa, 
while expenditure has grown at 13.4% pa.   
55. Our case studies of six local authorities describe the variations in the markets across a mix of 
urban and rural authorities in the North and South of England.  Local authorities have to deal 
with often very different profiles of clients in terms of their demographics (age, ethnic profile, 
income levels and deprivation and so on), and consequently in terms of their needs.  The impact 
of this on local provision is shown in the case studies. 
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Funding 
56. The sources of funding for the markets are a defining characteristic of each market.  The table 
below describes what we have found in terms of how these markets are funded, which can be a 
mixture of local authority core budget, central Government grants, voluntary and community 
sector funding or, notably in the case of the childcare market, a traditionally consumer funded 
market where parents pay in private transactions with private and voluntary and community 
sector providers. 
Funding Sources 
 
Market Funding 
Children’s Homes • Almost all funding from Personal Social Services budget (core local authority budget) 
Fostering • Almost all funding from Personal Social Services budget (core local authority budget) 
Childcare • Consumer payments, including Government indirect subsidies, such as Working Tax Credit support 
make up the majority of funding (52% of sector funding in 2004) 
• Private companies support employees with funding, often supported by the Government’s 
Employer Voucher system. 
• Dedicated Schools Grant supports free places for 3 and 4 year olds 
• Grant support to settings delivered through local authorities, aimed at the private and third sectors, 
children’s centres and Extended Schools. 
Positive Activities 
for Young People 
• Minimal core local authority funding 
• Majority of funding from time-limited central Government grants, including: 
! Extended Schools Standard Fund (DfES) 
! Music Services Standards Fund (DfES) 
! Positive Futures (HO) 
! Positive Activities for Young People Fund (HO) 
! New Opportunities Fund (DCLG) 
! The Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (DCLG) 
! New Deal for Communities Fund (DCLG) 
Parental & Family 
Support Services 
• Minimal core local authority funding 
• Majority of funding from time-limited central Government grants and Lottery funding, including: 
! Extended Schools Standard Fund (DfES) 
! The Children’s Fund (DfES) 
! The Parenting Fund (DfES) 
! The Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (DCLG) 
• Wide range of other funds including VCS funding 
 
57. We note in particular the differences between the funding for the different markets: 
• Children’s homes and fostering are funded primarily through core local authority budgets. 
• Childcare is primarily a private sector market, (although with increasing amounts of public 
sector funding through various routes). 
• Funding characteristics follow similar patterns across positive activities and parental and 
family support services; the majority of funding is not through the core local authority 
budget, but from targeted, time-limited central Government grants. 
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• The fragmentation of this funding and its time-limited nature makes strategic planning 
difficult, and raises questions over whether the service can be sustained in the long-term.  
This provides difficulties for both commissioners and providers in how they distribute and 
access funding, as well as in long-term planning. 
Commissioning 
58. Commissioning approaches fundamentally reflect the type of funding and the nature of 
provision, but also vary within each market. 
59. We found that all of the case study local authorities we met were working towards the DfES’ key 
aims for effective commissioning, which are: 
• Better planning and choice; 
• Raising quality; 
• Improving partnership working; 
• Building a supply of local provision. 
60. We observed a number of different commissioning strategies.  In children’s homes and fostering, 
the commissioning strategies of the case study authorities fell into two groups of three.  The key 
characteristic of both groups (all six authorities) is that they prioritise in-house provision over the 
external market; the difference between the groups was that the first encouraged the external 
market by entering into a dialogue with them to develop local supply, while the second did not. 
61. Our observation is that these strategies are driven by political disposition and the atmosphere of 
mistrust that exists between local authorities and the private sector.  The perception is also held 
by many local authorities that private provision is more expensive than in-house provision.  Our 
conclusion is that this is perception only, and is not substantiated by a consistent analysis of like-
for-like data by local authorities. 
62. We identified several issues in local authority commissioning, which are noted more fully in 
Section 5.  These include; the dual role of commissioner and provider, which gives rise to the 
behaviour noted in the paragraphs above; limited demand management at local authority level; 
demand which is insufficiently visible to providers; supply which is insufficiently visible to 
commissioners; poor market intelligence data; a lack of skills and capabilities in commissioning; 
and commissioning processes that are poorly developed and often disjointed across local 
authorities. 
63. These issues are most apparent in the commissioning of children’s homes and fostering services.  
We observed instances in the six local authorities we interviewed where good commissioning 
practices resulted in discounts from the external market that were otherwise not available, 
suggesting that best value-for-money is not being achieved everywhere.  
64. Our interview programme with voluntary and community sector providers raised the issue of 
how their provision is commissioned and funded.  Interviewees commented upon how service 
level agreements were being drawn up as part of competitively tendered contracts, often by 
inexperienced commissioners, with inappropriate performance measures in them.  Designing 
appropriate performance measures for voluntary and community sector providers needs to be a 
feature of improved commissioning and procurement practices for it to become a viable 
alternative to grant funding and partnership working.  This issue was raised more commonly by 
voluntary and community sector providers in positive activities and parental and family support 
services. 
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Description of Supply 
65. Our detailed reports of the five markets provide considerable amounts of information on the 
supply side.  
66. In assessing the common characteristics of the five markets we have used a classical economic 
model of market contestability to assess the degree of competition within the market place: 
Oligopoly Monopolistic Competition
Perfect 
CompetitionMonopolyMarket Structure
Key Characteristics
Number of 
Organisations
Size of 
Organisations
Barriers to Entry 
and Exit
Product Differentiation
Supernormal Profits
Price Setting Ability
One Several Many Many
Large Large Small Small
Significant Significant Few None
None Some Some None
In Short Run and
Long Run
Depends In Short Run only In short Run only
Total Interdependence Some None  
 
67. We have drawn up the table below based on this economic model to make a comparison of 
competition in the market place. 
Supply Side of the Markets – Key Characteristics 
 
Market Number of Orgs. Size of Org. Barriers to 
Entry and Exit 
Product Differ. Supernormal 
Profits 
Price Setting 
Ability 
Children’s 
Homes 
• 2,040 homes 
• c.480 Private 
providers and 
c.60 voluntary 
• Largest £28m 
turnover 
• Typically 
below £10m 
• Medium  • Limited • In short run 
only 
• Limited 
Fostering • 385 agencies 
• c.30,000* 
carers 
• Largest £70m 
turnover 
• Typically 
below £10m 
turnover 
• Low to 
medium  
• Limited • In short run 
only 
• Limited 
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Market Number of Orgs. Size of Org. Barriers to 
Entry and Exit 
Product Differ. Supernormal 
Profits 
Price Setting 
Ability 
Childcare • 105,000 
registered 
settings 
(c.25,000 
settings 
excluding 
childminders) 
• c.1,870 orgs** 
• For the PVI 
nursery 
sector: 
! Largest 
£52m 
turnover 
! Typically 
£1m to 
£10m 
turnover 
• The child-
minding 
sector is 
dominated by 
low income 
micro 
businesses 
• Low to 
Medium  
• Limited • In short run 
only 
• Limited 
Positive 
Activities for 
Young 
People*** 
• c.320 Youth 
Services 
• Multitude of 
VCS and 
private 
providers 
• Small • Low  • By activity 
• By tier of need 
• Limited to 
some 
private 
sector 
niches 
• None 
Parental & 
Family 
Support 
Svcs**** 
• c.6000 
providers 
• c.1000 
children’s 
centres 
• Small and 
medium VCS 
orgs 
• Small private 
sector orgs 
• Low  • By tier of need • Limited to 
some 
private 
sector 
niches  
• None 
 
*    Based on the assumption that an average carer has 1.4 children placed with them. 
**  Estimated by Laing & Buisson for providers with 3 or more settings.  Our work focused on the PVI nursery sector. 
*** Data in the table is representative of Positive Activities excluding Leisure (leisure is the only market segment with 
significant private sector provision within the definition) 
**** Data in the table is representative of preventative services provided in Parental & Family support in tiers 1 and 2 only.  
Tiers 3 and 4 are statutory services that local authorities must provide. 
 Note: Supernormal profits are profits that can be generated in excess of expected shareholder returns. 
 
68. There are several conclusions that can be drawn: 
• The markets are all very fragmented at a national level, and there are very few large 
organisations (eg, there are only one or two with an annual turnover over £50m in markets 
that range from £800m in value to over £6bn).  The opportunity to set price at a national level 
is very limited. 
• Barriers to entry and exit can typically be described as low to medium, with the highest entry 
barriers being in children’s homes, where the set up costs can be substantial.  Regulation was 
not cited during our interviews as being a barrier in itself, but starting up a new children’s 
home in line with regulation is a costly exercise.  In some areas, at present regulation is also 
heavily subsidised. 
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• There is some opportunity for product or service differentiation, but it is limited.  An 
example of service differentiation is independent fostering agencies developing additional 
wrap-around and support services for high-need, challenging teenagers, which increases cost 
and therefore drives prices higher. 
69. This analysis suggests that the markets are contestable, but there are two further observations 
that we would make.  Firstly, while the markets are contestable at a national level, 
commissioning is done at a local level, which raises the question of local contestability.  
Secondly, these markets are public sector markets with diverse provision and local authority 
commissioning (with the exception of childcare), which raises questions of competitive 
neutrality (ie, a level playing field). 
70. Taking the issue of local contestability first; at a local level, choice can be very limited.  An 
example of this is the market for children’s homes, where it is not uncommon for demand to be 
as low as 20 to 40 beds, enough to fill only half-a-dozen homes.  The variation of the balance of 
demand and supply by local authority area is demonstrated by our analysis of over and 
undersupply of children’s homes places in 2004.  In spite of national oversupply, some areas are 
still undersupplied and not fully served by the market. 
Under / Over Supply in Children’s Homes  
 
Source: CSCI, Children Looked After by Local Authorities Year Ending March 2004, Table A, DfES Research and Statistics Gateway, 
PwC Analysis
Map of Children's Homes Places at 31st March 2004 by Local Authority
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71. The implication of this is that, even in a market like children’s homes that is in oversupply 
nationally, the market is not necessarily in oversupply locally.  The opportunity therefore still 
exists for providers to charge higher prices in undersupplied areas.  Combined with ineffective 
commissioning this can and sometime does result in poor value-for-money. 
72. On the second issue, that of competitive neutrality, in-house, private sector and voluntary and 
community sector providers all have significant market shares in children’s homes, fostering and 
childcare.  Market shares are shown below: 
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*Note: For Foster Care the split 
between private and voluntary is not 
available and the data for “Private” 
includes both categories (Other 
includes children fostered with 
Friends and Family).
Also note that the data for Children’s 
Homes does not represent the 
number of children actually placed 
(occupancy levels of each type are 
not available) but we believe that 
occupancy in Local Authority 
homes, and probably voluntary 
homes, is significantly higher than in 
Private homes in the current market
Supply of Places for Looked After Children and Child Care in 
2005/2006 by Private*, Voluntary* and Local Authority
7,300
6,058
531,798
1,280
260,339
26,700
4,249
141,648 7,600
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Child Care Children's Homes Foster Care
Other
LA
Voluntary
Private
Source: Laing and Buisson ChildCare Database 2006 - Dataset 53, CSCI  
 
73. The market with the largest and most established private sector provision is the childcare market. 
Our interviews indicated that the Government strategy to provide free places for 3 and 4 year 
olds, and to provide provision for under fives and their families in children’s centres, is causing 
concern among private providers; government intentions are not fully understood. 
74. Private sector provision in children’s homes and fostering has grown significantly in the last five 
years.  As the private sector has grown and introduced new capacity and additional services it 
has become important to ensure that a level playing field exists for all providers. 
75. There is evidence that a level playing field among diverse providers is not always present in 
these markets. Issues we have identified in the fostering market are typical and include; a lack of 
transparency on costs; limited visibility of markets; and a shortage of experienced 
commissioners, all of which mitigate against good procurement practice.  In addition, 
inconsistent application of overall national frameworks and potentially conflicting roles of local 
authorities as commissioner and provider can lead to preferential treatment of in-house 
providers. 
76. At the same time, in-house providers are constrained from managing their operations in a 
competitive market, as they have limited access to finance, accounting systems that do not give 
good visibility over costs, and are without certain skills and experience. Again, these issues are 
discussed more fully in Section 5. 
77. The private sector evaluates market attractiveness, and market barriers, with a view to 
understanding the likely competitive intensity; if competitive intensity is relatively low and a 
position can be defended then it offers a private sector supplier the opportunity to make attractive 
returns. 
78. A classical and widely accepted framework for understanding market attractiveness and barriers 
is the Five Forces framework from Michael Porter.  We have conducted a Five Forces analysis 
for two segments of the positive activities market; Youth Services, where there is no private 
sector, and leisure services where the private sector is present.  Firstly for the Youth Service: 
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New Entrants
New entrants are likely due to moderate barriers to 
entry
• Many barriers to entry are low: little capital 
investment; short term contracts, limited economies 
of scale and lots of niche opportunities
• However, higher barriers include the need to recruit 
qualified youth workers capable of dealing with 
sharp end provision, the complexity of  regulation 
and performance monitoring requirements
• Many private investors do not have the necessary 
experience to operate in this market and are unlikely 
to invest in building expertise due to poor potential 
return on investment and no long term picture of 
demand from the local authorities
Competitive Intensity
The market is characterised by diverse and 
fragmented supply
• The market is highly fragmented, consisting of a 
broad range and large number of suppliers offering a 
diversity of services
• Cost advantages for the VCS, through the use of 
volunteers, results in an unlevel competitive playing 
field for private providers
• There are lots of opportunities for niche/diversified 
activities provision
Substitutes
Numerous alternatives for provision exist and local 
authorities’ models of delivery tends to alternate 
between years
• The past few years have seen a trend towards 
targeted provision for ‘high risk’ young people, with 
a greater emphasis on programmes of activities rather 
than universal youth centre provision
• Under this model numerous programme alternatives 
exist and continue to emerge, with government (and 
LA) provision focus changing year to year
Suppliers
The key input to running a successful Youth 
Service is suitably qualified staff
• Youth Services’ current focus on targeted 
activity based provision means that qualified 
staff are crucial
• However, due to the profile of the young people 
served,  it is typically difficult to recruit willing 
staff with suitable qualifications
Buyers
The balance of power remains with the local authority 
commissioners
• Under the current commissioning model, the short 
term nature of contracts and provider dependence on 
local authority funding (due to the inability to raise 
funds from the end user) ensures that local authority 
commissioners hold the balance of power
• The end user base is targeted, providing limited 
opportunities to spread risk should popularity of 
services decline. In addition, users consist of young 
people (who are typically cash poor) and generally 
target more disadvantaged areas of society, resulting 
in issues of poor behaviour, criminality and potential 
bad publicity for the provider
• Government and local authority objectives for the 
Youth Service vary over time and by region, making 
it complex for providers to match delivery 
requirements and preventing long term strategic 
planning
 
79. And secondly for leisure services: 
New Entrants
New entrants are unlikely due to the high barriers to 
entry
• There are many barriers to entry; high capital 
investment; long term contracts (and associated 
switching costs); dependence on facilities; significant 
economies of scale; planning rules and bureaucracy
• For the mainstream market, the stability of demand 
and large number of  existing leisure centres leaves 
little incentive for entrants to invest in building new 
mainstream facilities in areas where sufficient 
capacity already exists to meet demand
Competitive Intensity
The market is characterised by consolidated supply
• High levels of capacity investment and significant 
economies of scale have resulted in a concentrated 
supplier base
• Growth of the Trust model of partnership has recently 
limited private sector growth 
Substitutes
From the local authority perspective there are few 
alternatives to leisure centres
• Leisure centre provision represents a core component 
of most local authorities’ offering and this seems 
unlikely to change
• From the end user perspective the use of leisure 
centres is ingrained in society and this trend also 
seems likely to continue
• Even if attractiveness among certain market 
segments diminishes it may increase in others, 
creating a broad balance in demand
Suppliers
The key costs of running a leisure centre 
are associated with property, utility bills 
and staff 
• Leisure centres are expensive to run and 
operate, representing a substantial fixed 
cost investment
• Energy costs in particular are a 
significant, and growing, cost burden
• Successful training and recruitment of 
staff is important and leisure centres 
generally represent an attractive 
employment option
• Local authority run leisure centres are 
typically not operated in the most 
commercial manner and potential for 
significant cost savings exists
Buyers
Providers hold power over local authorities and 
have the advantage of a diverse end-user 
customer base
• Local authorities are tied into relationships with 
providers due to high switching costs, including 
long term contracts and the inability to pay back 
the large capital investments that are typically 
made by the provider
• End user base is diverse and covers mainstream 
society – providing access to cash-rich older 
generations, diversifying risk in situations of 
leisure popularity slow down in certain market 
segments and allowing opportunities for a 
premium price offering to boost revenues
• The existance of a cash income independent of 
government allows providers autonomy
 
 
80. The lack of a level playing field can dissuade private sector entrants, but where a market is 
sufficiently attractive, it is not an insurmountable barrier to entry. 
81. Within children’s services markets the lack of a level playing field does need to be addressed to 
ensure effective operation of markets.  Our conclusion is that the DfES can play a significant role 
in removing the barriers as well as in encouraging good commissioning. 
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5 Common Issues for Market 
Development 
82. We have identified a wide range of issues common to these markets, which are impacting upon 
their development and their ability to respond to demand.  These issues in general are barriers or 
inhibitors to the smooth operation of the markets, and need to be addressed to improve the 
market efficiency. 
83. Firstly, there is no common understanding or appreciation among local authorities of what a 
vision for their local markets could, or should, look like. This is perhaps not surprising since it 
requires considerable experience, capability and familiarity – and data - to develop a sense of 
what would be a satisfactory diversity of provision.   
84. Secondly, where local authorities are both providers and commissioners, there is evidence that 
there is not a level playing field. 
85. Local markets can be distorted by the local authority dual role of commissioner and provider.  
All six of the case study local authorities preferred to commission in-house services in children’s 
homes and fostering to using the external market, as long as a placement matches the child’s 
needs.  Some private providers believe that local authority commissioner expectations of external 
provision are not the same as those they have for in-house provision, for example on the quality 
of properties, the range and quality of services they provide, and their CSCI inspection reports. 
86. There is a lack of transparency on cost and price.  More than one of the local authorities we 
interviewed indicated that the full cost of in-house provision is significantly higher than that 
returned in PSS expenditure forms.  Local authorities consider that in-house services are cheaper, 
but this view is not supported by analysis of like-for-like data. 
87. Thirdly, local markets can be too small to be contestable, limiting choice and preventing 
commissioners from gaining value for money. 
88. We cite the example in Section 4 of the market for children’s homes, where it is not uncommon 
for demand to be as low as 20 to 40 beds, enough to fill only half-a-dozen homes, and in spite of 
national oversupply, some areas are still undersupplied and not fully served by the market. 
89. Fourthly, local authorities need assistance to manage local markets.  There are many issues that 
currently present local authorities with difficulties as they consider how best to commission or 
provide services. 
90. All of the children’s services markets are opaque and difficult to size with any degree of 
precision, even at a local level.  This is less true of childcare, but a real issue with positive 
activities and parental and family support services. 
91. There is limited demand management carried out by local authorities, and as a result demand is 
often not very visible to providers.  The ability to predict demand varies across authorities and 
presents them with a significant challenge.  One of the local authorities we researched is 
conducting a demand assessment at a street by street level for childcare, but this takes time and 
resource.   
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92. The lack of demand forecasting means that commissioners do not have the data they need to put 
together an appropriate commissioning strategy, to plan for capacity in-house, to involve 
external agencies in planning, to offer secure occupancy levels to external agencies or to explore 
block contracts for predictable demand. 
93. Local authorities have low visibility of supply side market intelligence, and limited data, 
although this is improving.  Several of the case study authorities are in the process of mapping 
markets: 
• Arrangements such as the pan-London contract offer some visibility on price, likewise 
preferred supplier arrangements 
• Some authorities are building databases of suppliers showing external capacity, prices that 
are being charged and quality indicators 
94. The necessary skills and capabilities to commission successfully are in scarce supply.  In one 
authority we interviewed, the commissioning and contracting role for external agency work was 
carried out by an individual with an extensive social work background in looked-after-children, 
and all the necessary commercial and interpersonal skills to successfully procure.  This 
combination of skills, experience and personal qualities was not widespread among local 
authorities interviewed. 
95. Commissioning processes are poorly developed and often disjointed across local authorities.  
Particular issues that this gives rise to with commissioning of voluntary and community sector 
provision in positive activities and parental and family support services are: 
• Commissioning decisions are typically made by multiple stakeholders across multiple 
departments; 
• A strong culture of grant giving still remains in the majority of local authorities, but there is a 
shift towards competitive tendering and formal contracting for services; 
• Where formal contracts are in place, local authorities are finding it difficult to define 
appropriately and monitor the outcomes they require providers to deliver; 
• Many voluntary sector organisations are also finding it challenging to adequately monitor 
and measure their performance against the targets being set for them. 
96. Local authority approaches to market management are heavily influenced by political 
disposition. The culture within a majority of the local authorities we interviewed is negative 
towards the private sector, with a feeling that the profit motive is inappropriate for children’s 
services.  The mistrust is mutual, and it limits the ability of commissioners and private provides 
to work together. 
97. Fifthly, sources of funding are not transparent, can be disjointed, and introduce cost into the 
system.  Again, this is particularly the case in positive activities and parental and family support 
services.  The majority of services in these markets are funded from targeted, fragmented and 
time-limited central Government Funds and grants; 
• The majority of funding sources are time-limited and fragmented in nature.  This exacerbates 
still further the fragmented and complex nature of service delivery within these two markets. 
• This raises questions on the sustainability of the “market intervention”.  If it is covering for a 
market failure how will it be sustained long-term? 
 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 21
98. Sixthly, the market needs greater visibility of DfES policy and market development strategy.  
There was evidence from our interview programme with external market providers that they did 
not understand Government policy and strategy, and were confused regarding Government 
intentions in the long-term.  There is evidence emerging in the childcare market that the strategy 
to provide extended free places for 3 and 4 year olds, and to provide provision for under-fives 
and their families in children’s centres is causing concern among private providers. 
99. Similarly, the time-limited nature of central Government grant funding for positive activities and 
parental and family support services means that Government’s intention for these markets 
beyond the current time-horizon (often three years) is not well communicated.  While markets 
can change significantly in a three year period, and the Government cannot be seen to provide 
assurances of unlimited funding, it is nevertheless desirable to offer some greater levels of 
assurance to market participants. 
100. It is our view that these barriers, or inhibitors, need to be addressed to improve the operation of 
the markets.  The DfES can play a significant role in removing the barriers and encouraging 
effective and strategic commissioning. 
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6 Independent Provision 
101. We have drawn on our research of the five markets to make some observations on the role the 
voluntary and community sector is playing, and can play in the future. 
Voluntary and Community Sector (VCS) 
Conditions that attract market participation 
102. The voluntary and community sector is present to a greater or lesser extent in all the markets 
researched and plays a significant role. For example, in the fostering market large national 
voluntary and community providers such as NCH or Barnardos compete alongside large private 
providers in a well established market.  In other markets such as parental and family support 
services, a range of smaller providers has pioneered the local development of services in the 
sector, while the private sector does not take a significant share of the market. 
103. Parental and family support services is an interesting example: 
• The market is not large and established, but at an early stage of development (if indeed it 
does develop); 
• Target clients are not necessarily in a position to pay, for example if they are socially 
disadvantaged, unemployed and so on; 
• A gap in need is being filled that is not being met by statutory service provision, or by the 
private sector. 
104. There are other examples where voluntary and community provision has been able to respond to 
this gap; some of the case study local authorities described rural areas where the population is 
too dispersed for a private provider to justify a business case, and the voluntary and community 
sector is able to fill the gap in a different form.  
Value added 
105. We see many areas of added value that the voluntary and community sector brings to children’s 
services, some of which resonate with other reviews of voluntary and community sector added 
value of which we are aware.  These include: 
• The ability to provide specialist niche provision, often supported by unsurpassed local 
knowledge; 
• Flexibility and responsiveness; unconstrained by statutory obligations or by shareholder 
requirements; 
• The ability to innovate where others are constrained; 
• Highly motivated, passionate and altruistic organisational and personal objectives. As a result 
they are perceived as “doing it for the right reasons”; 
• Independence.  The ability to work in partnership with local authorities rather than as a 
contractor; 
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• Cost effectiveness; 
• Funding, to address a need other models or resources cannot bring; 
• Advocacy and lobbying. 
Private Sector 
Conditions to attract market participation 
106. The private sector has a significant market share of several of the markets we researched; 
children’s homes, fostering and childcare.  Clearly the private sector is present in positive 
activities, but catering very much to the more affluent “can pay” population rather than the 
population targeted by current Youth Service provision; while in parental and family support 
services the private sector has a relatively small presence. 
107. We would make the following observations on the conditions that attract the private sector to 
children’s services markets, based on what we have seen: 
• The market is sufficiently large and growing to offer a significant revenue opportunity and a 
satisfactory profit; 
• The ability to improve services through efficiency and innovation; 
• Strong drivers of demand; customers who are willing and able to pay; and selling costs that 
are manageable; 
• The ability to access the skills and capabilities it needs to deliver services successfully; 
• Barriers to entry are manageable. 
Value added 
108. We see many areas of added value that the private sector can bring to children’s services, 
although we are conscious that there are sensitivities around private sector involvement in some 
children’s services markets.  The extent of the private sector’s involvement in the fostering 
market in particular, and the fact that independent fostering agencies are able to make a 
satisfactory level profit in a growing market, has been the subject of considerable discussion 
during our local authority interviews. 
109. Areas of potential added value we have observed include: 
• The ability to raise investment capital, justified by a business case; 
• Efficiency (driven by the need to generate a profit to survive); 
• The ability to raise quality and standards (if the market can stand the price increase that may 
accompany it); 
• The ability to innovate (driven by the need for competitive advantage); 
• Responsiveness (examples appear to be how quickly the private sector has added capacity in 
fostering, but also the enthusiastic response of the private sector to many Extended Schools 
as a channel to market). 
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7 Suggestions for Improvement  
Introduction 
110. We have drawn out some learning points from our research on these markets and have put 
forward six overarching suggestions on how the DfES could further develop children’s services 
markets in line with its policy on contestable markets. 
111. The first suggestion is that the DfES should articulate a vision for market provision, based on 
best practice. 
112. The evidence from the six case study areas suggests that many commissioners do not have a 
strong sense of what the vision for their local market could, or should, be.  In our view it would 
be helpful for DfES to provide a degree of guidance on what local authorities should expect 
diverse provision to look like in children’s services markets, based on its knowledge of best 
practice.  Our research does suggest that there is no “one-size-fits-all”, and that a vision for 
market provision should be a guideline only. 
113. The second suggestion is that the DfES should encourage a level playing field. 
114. The need to create a level playing field is paramount, as the evidence suggests that markets such 
as children’s homes and fostering are distorted by the local authority dual role of commissioner 
and provider.   
115. Encouraging greater separation between the local authority commissioning function and in-house 
provision is essential, and will help overcome the mistrust that frequently exists between local 
authority commissioners and private providers.  The DfES could encourage this separation by 
providing alternative organisational models for local authorities to follow, with practical testing 
through local authority pilots. 
116. We have made several suggestions to assist local authorities to develop more professional 
procurement practices, but also to remove constraints on in-house providers to enable them to 
compete effectively on a more level playing field. 
117. The third suggestion is that the DfES should encourage the development of regional markets. 
118. Evidence suggests that local markets can be relatively small, that choice is limited, and that there 
is no effective competition at a local level.  DfES could work through the DfES CPP with 
regional centres of excellence to encourage the development of regional commissioning.  We 
have suggested funding of pilot schemes to demonstrate the benefits to local authorities. 
119. The fourth suggestion is that the DfES should assist local authorities to manage local markets. 
120. There is a great deal of evidence from the six case study areas that local authorities find it 
difficult to manage their local children’s services markets effectively, although there are 
exceptions where successful market management is providing some useful lessons. 
121. We have made several suggestions for actions the DfES could implement to assist local 
authorities in managing their markets.  These suggestions include providing templates, 
disseminating best practice, encouraging and sponsoring forums, and so on. 
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122. The fifth suggestion is that the DfES should encourage reduced complexity and increased 
transparency of funding. 
123. Funding characteristics follow similar patterns across positive activities and parental and family 
support services; the majority of funding is not through the core local authority budget, but from 
targeted, time-limited central Government grants (some of these are provided by the DfES such 
as the Extended Schools Standard Fund or the Children’s Fund, but others are provided by the 
Home Office or the DCLG, for example The Neighbourhood Renewal Fund or the New Deal for 
Communities Fund). 
124. The fragmentation of this funding and its time-limited nature makes strategic planning difficult, 
and raises questions over whether the service can be sustained in the long-term.  This provides 
difficulties for both commissioners and providers in how they distribute and access funding, as 
well as in long-term planning. 
125. We have made several suggestions to the DfES to reduce this complexity, but we recognise this 
will require the cooperation of at least the DCLG and the Home Office. 
126. The sixth and final suggestion is that the DfES should improve visibility of DfES policy and 
market strategy. 
127. We have made the suggestion that the DfES develops a communication strategy to provide 
assurances to in-house, private and voluntary and community sector providers that it understands 
their concerns and is addressing them through its market development programme. 
128. We have summarised below a set of detailed suggestions, actions, rationale and issues in support 
of these overarching suggestions. 
129. We have further highlighted the implementation risks at the end of this section. 
Suggestions for Improvement 
Articulating a vision for market provision, based on best practice; 
Suggested Improvement Possible Actions Rationale Issues and Risks 
• Develop a quantified 
picture of market demand 
and supply 
• Carry out market mapping 
of each children’s services 
market, including both 
demand and supply, at 
both a national level and 
local authority level. 
• Work with local 
authorities and regional 
centres of excellence to 
generate the market maps 
at a local or regional level. 
• Critical to develop some 
visibility of demand and 
supply and how they vary 
by local authority area. 
• Provides the evidence 
base to enable DfES to 
begin to articulate supply 
side market “models” that 
deliver good outcomes 
and value for money  
• Skill sets may limit 
implementation 
• Substantial task requiring 
significant local 
knowledge and resource 
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Suggested Improvement Possible Actions Rationale Issues and Risks 
• Identify models of 
provision that can be 
considered good practice, 
ie, where the market is 
delivering good outcomes 
and value for money; and 
those where there appears 
to be some market failure 
• Work with local 
authorities, regional 
centres of excellence, to 
collate a range of models. 
• Identify the drivers of 
success or failure, and the 
outcomes different models 
deliver. 
• Develop a shortlist of 
models. 
• There are (as we know 
from our case studies) 
different models that work 
in different local authority 
areas for different reasons. 
• Helps spread best practice 
and market understanding 
among commissioners so 
they can make more 
informed decisions 
• Models may not be easily 
characterised or the 
drivers of their specific 
advantages readily 
understood 
• Outcomes difficult to 
measure or find data on 
• Develop a range of 
models for market 
provision, as outline 
guidance for local 
authorities 
• Develop different models 
to be discussed at 
appropriate forums. 
• Develop web-based 
documentation that 
provides models and 
supporting analysis 
• Post details in 
“commissioners 
newsletters” 
• A range of models at a 
local or regional level is 
better than a single vision; 
there is no “one-size-fits-
all”. 
• Range of models gives 
local authority 
commissioners the ability 
to develop a vision for the 
market place that is 
informed by local 
environments not 
“imposed from above” 
• Range of models may be 
too disparate to be of 
value to local authorities – 
could cause confusion 
• Only of value if a local 
authority has visibility of 
its own market  
 
Encourage a level playing field; 
Suggested Improvement Possible Actions Rationale Issues 
• Create greater institutional 
separation between the 
local authority 
commissioning function, 
and in-house provision 
• Develop alternative 
practical models for LAs to 
follow, based on successful 
case studies (case studies 
would need to be located – 
this has not been achieved 
by our case study 
authorities) 
• Develop a national forum 
for disseminating best 
practice in organisational 
separation 
• Describe the organisational 
requirements in detail to 
authorities – i.e. identify 
key roles that must be 
separated 
• Consider funding and 
delivering in a pilot area, 
DfES led, if this practice is 
not already in place 
• Current market is 
“distorted” by the 
conflict of interest 
between LAs that 
commission and provide 
(the majority). 
• Institutional separation 
will provide a structural 
incentive for greater 
transparency and a level 
playing field 
• Will provide an 
incentive for in-house 
providers to generate 
greater clarity on their 
full operating costs. 
• Will begin to generate 
reduced costs through 
more explicit 
competition 
• What is the long term 
incentive for the LA to 
incur the cost of this? 
• Does DfES need to fund a 
transition? 
• This must go hand in hand 
with better accounting – 
i.e. the skill sets to 
account for, view and 
monitor in-house 
provision in the way a 
business would 
• Political will is likely to 
be a considerable barrier 
• The costs / process of 
change may be high or 
prohibitive. Need to be 
understood before the 
process starts 
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Suggested Improvement Possible Actions Rationale Issues 
• Facilitate the separation of 
“owner” and “provider” 
functions for in-house 
provision.  
• Pilot scheme based on other 
markets where this has been 
done, i.e. property company 
to set up, provider to 
manage (prop co/op co) 
• Centrally led activity to 
deliver this 
• Removes the barrier of 
property investment for 
providers or potential 
providers (new entrants) 
• Provides greater clarity 
and transparency on 
property and 
infrastructure investment 
vs. operating costs 
• Will enable in-house 
providers to focus on 
service provision rather 
than property 
management 
• Political will could be a 
barrier 
• Cost / process of change 
(as above) 
• Demonstrating the 
benefits of this to LAs 
may be a challenge 
• Separating owner and 
provider may not always 
be practicable 
• May dis-incentivise 
investors who consider 
ownership of property 
some security against 
financial failure – i.e. this 
may raise barriers to entry 
• Develop procurement 
practices that enable the 
management of proper 
competitions 
• Conduct competitions at a 
regional level if necessary 
to increase contract size 
and attract sufficient 
bidders 
• Create common 
requirements for in-house, 
3rd sector and private 
providers 
• Conduct transparent bid 
assessments 
• DfES sponsored 
procurement training for 
LAs that apply 
• DfES developed template 
models showing which type 
of approach suits which 
type of authority 
• Set out strict guidelines for 
core requirements from 
tender process – e.g. the 
inclusion of outcome 
monitoring reports – 
regardless of provider 
• Inspectors to review tender 
processes 
• Consider split contract types 
depending upon the market  
• Competitions need to be 
“plausible” (e.g, have 
characteristics of 
attractiveness to 
sufficient bidders, offer 
enough size and profit 
potential to attract 
quality providers, but be 
sufficiently flexible to 
offer scope for 
innovation) 
• Will provide an 
incentive for in-house 
providers to generate 
greater clarity on their 
full operating costs. 
• Long timeframe for 
improvements to come 
through 
• People with the right 
capabilities still difficult to 
find 
• Pilots required to prove the 
business case – may well 
require funding to attract 
authorities to the pilot 
 
• Remove constraints on in-
house providers to enable 
them to properly manage 
and innovate: 
! Improve skills and 
capabilities 
! Assistance with cost 
accounting 
! Access to finance if 
justified by a business 
case 
• Not guidelines but specific 
annual reports from in-
house providers to include 
all costs, costs per child, 
savings, outcomes – as 
commissioners would 
expect from private bidders 
for any contract. 
• Give in-house providers 
control (as well as 
visibility) over their full 
cost base.  May involve 
changing local authority 
organisational structures. 
• Consider more flexible 
approaches to employee 
terms and conditions. 
• They need to be allowed 
to compete in markets 
where LA political will 
exists to develop the 
market 
• Current constraints and 
structures prevent in-
house providers from 
being able to compete 
effectively even where 
conditions allow. 
• Other conditions need to 
be in place for a level 
playing field before this 
can be implemented (a 
long way off?) 
• May need to supplement 
local authority team with 
commercial operators 
• Risk of failure 
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Suggested Improvement Possible Actions Rationale Issues 
• Reinforce performance 
monitoring; 
! Monitor outcomes 
! Set out performance 
expectations and 
benchmarks 
! Introduce national 
standards and forms of 
accreditation in newer, 
developing markets 
• Identify where possible the 
indicators of good outcomes 
for children (or parents) 
• Work with local authority 
commissioners to identify 
ways that outcomes can be 
monitored, over time if 
necessary. 
• In newer less established 
markets encourage 
regulating bodies to work 
with local authorities to get 
services accredited 
• Similarly consult with the 
regulating bodies regarding 
the possible approaches to 
setting and monitoring 
performance benchmarks 
• Data on outcomes has 
been missing in our 
research; exploring ways 
that data on outcomes or 
indicators of good 
outcomes can be 
gathered over time 
would be valuable. 
• Benchmarking, and 
expanding the role of 
regulating bodies to 
collate evidence on 
performance may 
improve visibility of 
quality and incentivise 
all providers to deliver 
better quality 
• Outcomes and other 
indicators not easily 
identified 
• Could act as a barrier to 
eg, VCS providers if not 
“light touch” 
• Could overformalise. 
• Increase visibility and 
awareness of any 
unintended consequences 
of market development 
actions or investments 
• Tap into forums or 
communication channels in 
regional centres of 
excellence, local authorities 
and commissioning 
networks (eg, CPP 
Champions) to raise DfES 
awareness of emerging 
unintended consequences of 
market development action 
• Government actions in 
one part of a market may 
have a knock-on effect 
in another part of the 
market that is 
detrimental to other 
clients or consumers 
• Need to handle sensitively 
to get a balanced view 
• How to get an unfettered 
view from independent 
market providers without 
it being “filtered”? 
 
Encourage the development of regional markets; 
Suggested Improvement Possible Actions Rationale Issues 
• Develop approaches to 
facilitate the aggregation 
of demand between local 
authorities and to 
encourage the 
development of regional 
commissioning 
• Develop in the context of 
the joint commissioning 
framework 
• Work with regional 
centres of excellence 
where possible to begin to 
“scale up” and drive out 
greater benefits 
• May require funding of 
pilots or other initiatives 
to “underwrite” the costs 
that will be incurred to 
prove the business case 
• Initially drive 
understanding of demand 
! Detailed, clear list of 
what LAs need to 
know to drive a 
required needs 
assessment 
• Greater aggregation of 
demand (combined with 
regional market 
management) will enable 
supply to better match 
demand. 
• This should provide 
greater choice and, in due 
course, better value-for-
money. 
• Developing model – could 
be significant data 
challenges, some work is 
already underway 
regionally, but data are 
currently limited 
• Need a complete 
understanding of demand 
aggregation across 
authorities in current 
market – i.e. ask each LA 
to provide detail 
• Pilot model – may be best 
to use a current example 
as a pilot 
• Demonstrate incentive 
benefit 
• Trust (will supply-side 
deliver?) 
• Political will – LAs need 
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Suggested Improvement Possible Actions Rationale Issues 
! Performance indicators 
to include robust 
demand assessment 
! Assessment should be 
collated by DfES 
! Recommended 
regional aggregations 
that map against where 
supply is focused (full, 
geographical supply 
map required) 
• Set out examples of 
demand aggregation 
currently underway to 
demonstrate the scale of 
the benefits 
 
to be prepared to work 
together 
• Develop best practice 
models for dissemination 
for joint commissioning 
by a group of local 
authorities 
• Work with CPP, regional 
centres of excellence and 
local authorities to 
identify joint 
commissioning examples 
(none identified by our 
research) 
• Evaluate the benefits, and 
the practical steps 
necessary to make it work 
effectively 
• Disseminating best 
practice will encourage 
other local authorities to 
investigate the business 
case for moving to a 
regional model. 
• Each authority faces a 
different market, so it may 
be challenging for them to 
apply learning from other 
LAs 
• Requires resources to do 
this effectively 
 
Assist local authorities to manage local markets; 
Suggested Improvement Possible Actions Rationale Issues 
• Improve demand 
forecasting 
• Implement a clear demand 
forecasting analytical 
framework for LAs, 
including data 
requirements to form part 
of an annual return to 
DfES 
• Develop and implement a 
software based tool for 
forecasting to homogenise 
approach, based on best 
practice, and give to LAs. 
The tool may only be able 
to predict certain 
segments of demand. 
• Incentivise recruitment of 
skills into LAs 
 
• Improved demand 
forecasting, based on 
historical trends and an 
assessment of future 
drivers of demand, will 
provide LAs with greater 
clarity on market capacity 
needed at a local level to 
service future needs. 
• Enables LAs to begin to 
anticipate further ahead, 
and avoid “crisis 
purchasing” (and in due 
course improve value-for-
money). 
• Provides a basis for a 
dialogue with providers. 
• Can be perceived as a 
specialist technical area 
• LA skills sets may limit 
implementation 
• Required level of detail on 
drivers and trends to make 
forecasts robust may be 
prohibitive – particularly 
where volumes are low or 
the required in-house data 
are not available 
• Needs to demystified and 
clarified – i.e. suggests 
should be specific not 
broad indications 
• Issue of trust – can the 
forecasts be relied on by 
the market? 
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Suggested Improvement Possible Actions Rationale Issues 
• Standardise demand 
analysis to include an 
understanding of key 
drivers of demand 
• Clarify all the demand 
factors that must be 
considered. 
• Show LAs a clear, 
standardised means of 
carrying out the analysis 
by disseminating best 
practice, software and, if 
necessary, skill sets 
• Require that the demand 
analysis be collated (and 
therefore regularised) 
centrally and regularly 
updated to ensure that it is 
done and that analysis can 
be continuous 
 
• Regardless of intentions, 
LAs cannot deliver 
additional capacity 
without impacting the 
local market unless 
demand analysis is robust 
and detailed 
• Robust analysis can be 
achieved, as seen by our 
case studies. When it is 
done, it can change pre-
conceived assumptions 
about demand and 
resource allocation 
• Resource intensive 
exercise, and time 
consuming. LAs are faced 
with a high work load. 
• Misinterpreted or 
incorrect analysis could 
have significant 
consequences 
• Needs must be taken in 
the context of supply – it 
is the gap between 
demand and supply that is 
key 
• Develop supply side 
market intelligence (i.e, 
on providers) 
• Provide templates / 
databases for storing 
information – share 
examples, eg, the database 
in development by East 
Anglia/South East on 
LAC 
• Templates to include 
useful quality markers, on 
outcome performance (vs. 
expectations, not just 
national averages) 
• Could use these databases 
as a form of returns to the 
DfES for internal use and 
to encourage consistency 
• For cost transparency – 
consider regulatory 
guidance 
• Share a template generic 
model as a way to 
encourage both in-house 
and external providers to 
provide data on the same 
basis 
• Encourage LAs to review 
in-house provision in 
terms of outcomes, quality 
and price (value for 
money) on a 2 or 3 yearly 
basis 
• Visibility of supply in 
terms of capacity, vacancy 
and development will 
enable greater competition 
and greater choice 
• Commissioners also need 
to be aware of any 
providers that are 
struggling to deliver 
quality or a sustainable 
performance 
• Comparison on price and 
quality will enable 
commissioners to focus on 
value for money – in-
house services should be 
included 
• An understanding of cost 
base is essential 
• Resources may be limited 
in LAs. There may not be 
a commissioner in the 
right role with the time or 
desire to do this 
• First step to a dialogue 
may not be clear to LAs, 
e.g, is it a phone call or an 
open day? 
• There will be challenges 
in segmenting supply 
• Providers need to be 
trusted, in-house capacity 
fully understood 
• Getting up to date 
information on occupancy 
will be a challenge. 
Should be possible to get 
in-house providers to run 
a data base, but trusting 
private and voluntary 
providers to do so may be 
more challenging 
• Data burden on private 
and third sector providers 
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Suggested Improvement Possible Actions Rationale Issues 
• Engage in dialogue with 
market providers 
• Illustrate the benefits of 
dialogue by showing case 
studies to those in 
commissioning roles 
• DfES sponsored open 
days 
• Requirement for launch 
day with new 
commissioning strategies 
for children’s services, 
once produced, bringing 
all provision, including in-
house 
• DfES sponsored training, 
in which private providers 
are included 
• Provide facilitation 
resource for initial 
discussions to limit risk of 
breakdown or the sense of 
mistrust driving the 
outcome of the dialogue 
• Encourage willingness to 
engage – i.e. relationship 
building activities 
• Initial dialogue should be 
directed at discussion 
around strategy for 
managing volumes and 
delivering visibility of 
future requirements – this 
will incentivise providers 
to engage and offset their 
suspicions that dialogue is 
ultimately about price 
negotiation 
• In the absence of dialogue 
with the providers the 
market cannot be 
developed according to 
need 
• Dialogue with the market 
will begin to identify any 
unintended consequences 
of Government 
interventions in a market 
place 
• Where providers do not 
have visibility over LAs 
intentions regarding 
demand management they 
have no security – this 
results in speculation over 
where to build capacity, 
and high pricing to cover 
the risk of uncertain 
occupancy 
• It also sustains the level of 
mistrust and limits the 
likelihood of engaging in 
useful tendering or 
preferred supplier 
processes 
• Issue – the level of trust is 
poor between many 
authorities and providers 
in both directions. The 
suspicion around motives 
is mutual and is a 
significant barrier to 
initiating constructive 
dialogue 
• Political will and strategic 
positioning are also 
potential barriers. If the 
intention is to avoid 
private providers, barriers 
will be higher and 
dialogue may rapidly 
break down 
• Willingness to engage at 
an individual level may 
also be a barrier in both 
providers and LAs 
• Private provider strategies 
could prevent good 
dialogue. In under-
supplied areas providers 
may see dialogue simply 
as the start of moves to 
bring price pressure into 
the market 
• Develop a common 
commissioning 
framework that: 
! contains preferred 
supplier arrangements 
! considers how to use 
block contracts 
! enables flexibility so 
that the LA can adapt 
to its local 
environment 
• Need a framework that 
provides incentives for 
LAs to adhere to a 
common commissioning 
framework 
• Incentives to include 
resources and assistance 
• Clear, explicit examples – 
e.g. “how to set up a 
preferred provider list”, 
“things you must ask 
providers to deliver and or 
explain”, and so on. Show 
evidence for savings 
achieved in other 
providers 
• Clear examples of 
• Creating savings from 
external providers will in 
many cases require some 
improved revenue security 
for them 
• Increasingly seen as best 
practice – a good signal to 
the market place / 
generally 
• Will raise quality by 
increasing bidder interest 
• Has the potential to 
improve value-for-money 
through better local 
capacity utilisation – but 
has to be coupled with 
professional competitive 
• Key challenge in bringing 
together the breadth of 
current activities 
• A number of tools and 
guidance notes are already 
available, but not always 
being used. Understanding 
why this is and adapting 
the approach may be 
needed 
• Use of these arrangements 
is premised on having a 
large enough market for 
external providers in each 
location 
• Block contracts risk fixing 
the market and fixing the 
price so need to be 
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Suggested Improvement Possible Actions Rationale Issues 
tendering process for 
block contracts, 
disseminate knowledge 
from regional contracts, 
and explanations of when 
tendering is appropriate 
• Block contracts can be 
useful, but to set these up 
effectively requires very 
good quality demand 
analysis and prediction, 
and a high degree of 
flexibility. 
tendering processes. managed very carefully if 
used 
• Develop best practice 
models for dissemination 
for local authority 
commissioning 
• Newsletter for 
commissioning and 
contracting with examples 
• Annual review of – “Who 
generated the most 
savings, without dropping 
quality and how?” or 
“Most innovative 
approaches to driving 
quality from providers” 
• Some areas are aware of 
what other authorities are 
doing to improve 
commissioning 
• Best practice is not always 
disseminated 
• Each authority faces a 
different market, so it may 
be challenging for them to 
apply learning from other 
LAs 
• Requires resources to do 
this effectively 
 
Encourage reduced complexity and increased transparency of funding; 
Suggested Improvement Possible Actions Rationale Issues 
• Reduce funding 
complexity: 
! Consolidate funding 
streams 
! Join up decision 
making processes 
! Make different funds 
more distinct 
 
• Liaise with other 
Government departments 
with a view to: 
! consolidating funding 
streams 
! developing joint 
decision making 
processes 
! reviewing funding 
lifetimes 
• Likely to involve 
discussions with DCLG 
and Home Office 
• Greater co-ordination of 
funding and fewer funds 
will help drive co-
ordination of service 
delivery in local 
authorities 
• Reduce overlap in current 
spending across certain 
programmes 
• Reduction in funding 
complexity will reduce 
associated transaction 
costs for local authorities 
and VCS providers  
• Cannot be done by DfES 
alone – securing the co-
operation of other 
Government departments 
is essential 
• Will take time 
• Need to evaluate the 
impact of doing this on 
currently funded 
programmes 
• Make funding available 
on a longer term basis 
• Liaise with other 
Government departments 
with a view to 
encouraging longer 
timeframes where 
possible, or alternative 
mechanisms to encourage 
or sustain matched VCS 
or private sector funding 
to allow programmes to be 
mainstreamed 
• Longer time frames will 
facilitate more strategic 
planning of service 
delivery 
• It will also enable greater 
investment in building 
capacity of services on the 
ground 
• Cannot be done by DfES 
alone – securing the co-
operation of other 
Government departments 
is essential 
• Will take time 
• Need to evaluate the 
impact of doing this on 
currently funded 
programmes 
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Improve visibility of DfES policy and market strategy; 
Suggested Improvement Possible Actions Rationale Issues 
• Where possible, give 
assurances about longer 
term strategies 
• Setting out the long term 
strategy, as above, may 
give some certainty over 
intentions at least 
• Ministerial support for the 
long-term strategy would 
also help reassure 
• Much of the uncertainty in 
the market relates to 
sustainability of new 
capacity in the longer-
term 
• The expectation within the 
DfES and LAs is that 
some means of sustaining 
capacity will be 
developed, but they 
cannot act on this 
expectation 
• This uncertainty may 
prevent private and 
voluntary providers from 
taking part in LA/centrally 
funded schemes 
• Planning for new capacity 
may be carried out with a 
short-term mind set 
• There is no option, 
currently, to guarantee 
levels of funding in the 
long-term 
• Many people in the 
market and public sector 
have experienced frequent 
changes in policy in the 
past and may not trust 
assurances 
• Expectations need to be 
carefully managed and 
care must be taken over 
any commitments made 
• Need to avoid LAs and 
others making the 
assumption that funding 
will be unlimited 
• Develop a communication 
strategy to target market 
participants 
• Develop a communication 
programme, with key 
messages via different 
media, to ensure that a 
variety of market 
participants are aware of 
Government intentions 
• Coordinate with other 
Government departments 
• Government interventions 
in different markets can be 
misinterpreted 
• To avoid unintended 
consequences 
• Cost and resource 
necessary 
• How to target a wide 
range of market 
participants 
• Clarity of message 
 
Implementation Risks 
130. The tables above with suggestion also include a set of issues and risks.  There are some common 
themes running through these that to some extent can be mitigated.  We have sought to 
summarise below the key themes and some mitigating actions. 
Implementation Risks and Mitigating Actions 
Implementation Risk Possible Mitigating Actions 
• Political disposition, and continuing mistrust of the private 
sector, a barrier to the development of diverse provision 
• The benefits of diverse provision (including private sector) 
need to be demonstrated, probably through some 
pioneering local authorities and pilot schemes, with DfES 
and other Government departments’ encouraging and 
funding 
• Gradual process – only the development of real 
transparency in local authorities or regional centres of 
excellence will enable trust to be established 
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Implementation Risk Possible Mitigating Actions 
• Risk of creating bureacracy • Consultation within appropriate forums on what constitutes 
a “light touch” 
• Two way communication channels need to be opened 
between all parties involved 
• Appropriate incentives and mechanisms need to be put in 
place; local authorities cannot be mandated 
• The change necessary to create a level playing field is too 
slow, and meanwhile costs continue to escalate 
• Pilots needed to demonstrate the benefits to local 
authorities 
• Continued messages and support to local authorities to 
focus on professional procurement practices where possible 
while structures and processes change 
• Focus on “quick wins” as well as longer term strategies 
• Encourage use of children’s trusts, regional centres of 
excellence, CPP and so on to coordinate and accelerate 
change 
• The organisational change necessary in local authorities to 
create a level playing field is disruptive to services – and 
in-house service quality and commissioning suffers as a 
result 
• Plan carefully for organisational change – first 100 days 
planning under new structures 
• Encourage proper risk assessment 
• Disseminate best practice on organisational change 
• Establish a forum of organisation change practitioners in 
local government 
• Experienced people with the right skills to improve local 
authority commissioning remain difficult to find  
• Encourage wider search for people with the right 
commissioning skills (eg, procurement specialists from 
outside children’s services) 
• Flexible terms and remuneration to attract top quality 
people from the private sector 
• Encourage schemes to retrain suitable in-house 
practitioners into commercial commissioning specialists 
• DfES-led interventions to address market failures cause 
unintended consequences 
• Tap into consultation forums with local authorities, 
regional centres of excellence, and other networks of 
market participants 
• Two-way communication channels need to be established 
so that DfES can communicate its strategy – but also be 
made aware of emerging issues in the market place 
• Data on outcomes, demand and supply difficult to find or 
generate 
• Consider commissioning longer term research to 
investigate outcomes 
• Encourage forums and networks to share market data 
between local authorities 
• Build on CPP and regional centres of excellence to collate 
market data and disseminate 
• Develop market development specialists as data champions, 
and build and own databases.  Monitor and keep up to date 
constantly. 
 
131. We are in no doubt the DfES can and should play a key role in developing children’s services.  
While many of our suggestions carry implementation risk we believe that risk can be mitigated 
and that the DfES should consider in more detail how to take them forward. 
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